A controlled lab investigation showing how I used Defender XDR, Defender for Office 365, Defender for Endpoint, Entra ID, and KQL to connect phishing evidence, suspicious identity activity, malware execution, and endpoint response decisions.
Defender XDRDefender for Office 365Defender for EndpointEntra IDMalwareKQLAWS EC2
The scenario begins with a controlled phishing simulation delivered to lab users. It is designed to connect user interaction with identity-related suspicious activity and endpoint follow-on analysis. The recording and 19 supporting screenshots document the incident workflow, hunting queries, and response interfaces used in the lab.
Environment
Telemetry available to investigate
Microsoft Defender XDR, Defender for Office 365, Defender for Endpoint, Entra ID, Intune, Azure/Azure Arc, AWS EC2 Windows Server endpoints, KQL Advanced Hunting, PowerShell, and supporting OSINT/sandbox tools. This is a technology inventory, not a claim that every product is directly integrated.
Video Evidence
Watch the investigation walkthrough.
A full narrated walkthrough explaining the incident, investigation pivots, response approach, and conclusions. Supporting screenshots are organized by stage below.
Jump to a sectionFull recording · Original sequence
01 · CONFIRM / VALIDATE
Determine whether the alert represents real risk.
Review the phishing message, sender and authentication context, message trace, URLs or attachments, reported user interaction, related Defender alerts, and initial identity/endpoint signals. Separate confirmed facts from hypotheses.
01 · Incident accepted for investigation
Manage incident panel showing the In Progress status and incident classification.
02 · Alerts and incident graph
Defender XDR alert chain and relationships between incident entities.
02 · SCOPE
Establish the full blast radius.
Pivot across recipients, clicks, affected accounts, sign-ins, sessions, mailbox rules, devices, processes, files, network connections, and related indicators. Build a timestamped incident timeline and identify what is affected versus merely exposed.
03 · Affected assets
Assets associated with the incident, used to scope the endpoint investigation.
07 · UrlClickEvents: user interaction
URL-click query and results used to review which accounts interacted with links.
11 · Entra ID sign-in review
Sign-in log view and time filter. No sign-in records are displayed in this capture.
03 · CONTAIN
Stop active risk while preserving evidence.
Select containment proportional to confirmed activity: remove malicious mail, block validated indicators, revoke suspicious sessions, restrict the affected identity, or isolate an endpoint when endpoint compromise is supported.
12 · Password reset
Password-reset panel for the lab identity.
13 · Require MFA re-registration
Confirmation prompt for requiring the user to register MFA again.
14 · Revoke sessions
Confirmation notification for revoking the user’s sessions.
15 · Tenant IP blocking
Tenant Allow/Block List IP-entry panel, before a block is submitted.
16 · File-hash indicator
File hash entered in the Add indicator form.
18 · Aria device isolation
Device-isolation confirmation prompt for the Aria endpoint.
04 · INVESTIGATE / ROOT CAUSE
Correlate email, identity, and endpoint evidence.
Use Defender XDR and KQL to connect the delivery and interaction timeline with sign-in context, MFA events, mailbox activity, process trees, command lines, files, and outbound connections. Validate the likely entry point and follow-on behavior without treating impossible travel alone as proof.
04 · PowerShell alert
PowerShell alert details and command context reviewed during endpoint analysis.
05 · PowerShell entities
Entity details associated with the PowerShell alert.
06 · EmailEvents: email delivery
Advanced Hunting query and displayed email-event results.
08 · EmailAttachmentInfo: attachments
Attachment query and displayed results for the email investigation.
09 · DeviceFileEvents: file activity
Endpoint file-event query and displayed results.
10 · DeviceNetworkEvents: connections
Network-event query and displayed results for endpoint correlation.
19 · Aria Live Response
Live Response workspace for Aria, with the session in Waiting state.
05 · ERADICATE
Remove the verified cause and persistence.
Remove confirmed malicious artifacts or unauthorized access paths. Check inbox rules and forwarding, suspicious apps/sessions, startup locations, registry run keys, scheduled tasks, and other persistence relevant to the evidence.
17 · Aria antivirus scan
Antivirus scan prompt for the Aria device; scan completion is not shown in this frame.
06 · RECOVER
Restored access and verified normal activity.
I re-scanned the affected endpoints, reviewed sign-ins and mailbox activity, checked for recurring persistence and suspicious outbound connections, and restored access in a controlled way. I continued monitoring for signs of recurrence.
07 · DOCUMENT
Documented the findings and response decisions.
I documented the investigation timeline, affected assets, evidence, hunting queries, containment and remediation actions, and recovery checks. The record separated confirmed observations from assumptions and captured the reasoning behind my decisions, remaining limitations, and lessons learned.
08 · ESCALATION CRITERIA
Recognize when specialist support is needed.
I would escalate evidence of widespread compromise, privileged-account abuse, persistent access, or suspected data exfiltration to the incident response or DFIR team. My handoff would include confirmed findings, affected assets, the timeline, actions taken, and the specific decision or support required. IT would support restoration and coordinate operational impact.
Lab disclosure: This case study represents controlled home-lab work. Screenshots show the recorded interface state. Action prompts document the response workflow; completed outcomes are identified only where a result is visible.